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Abstract 
The introduction of the SME Supporting Factor (SF) allows banks to reduce capital 
requirements for credit risk on exposures to SME. This means that banks can free up 
capital resources that can be redeployed in the form of new loans. Our study documents 
that the SF alleviates credit rationing for medium-sized firms that are eligible for the 
application of the SF but not for micro/small firms. These results suggest that European 
banks were aware of this policy measure and optimized both their regulatory capital and 
their credit exposures by granting loans to the medium-sized firms, which are safer than 
micro/small firms. 
Keywords: SME, credit access, supporting factor, bank lending. 
JEL Classification: E51, E58, G21. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
La introducción del factor de soporte del crédito a las pequeñas y medianas empresas (pymes) 
—conocido como SME SF, por sus siglas en inglés— permite a los bancos reducir los 
requerimientos regulatorios de capital por dar financiación a este tipo de empresas. Esta 
medida implica que los bancos pueden liberar recursos de capital para ser reasignados en 
forma de nuevos préstamos. El presente trabajo muestra que el SME SF contribuyó a aliviar las 
restricciones de crédito de las empresas medianas que eran elegibles para la aplicación del 
SME SF, pero no así de las pequeñas y microempresas. Estos resultados sugieren que los 
bancos europeos optimizaron tanto su capital regulatorio como su riesgo crediticio por medio 
del aumento de la oferta de crédito a las empresas medianas, menos arriesgadas que las 
pequeñas y las microempresas. 
Palabras clave: pymes, restricciones crediticias, factor de soporte, crédito. 
Códigos JEL: E51, E58, G21. 
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1 Introduction 
Article 501(1) of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) introduces the small and medium 
enterprises (SME) Supporting Factor (SF) according to which “capital requirements for credit 
risk on exposures to SMEs shall be multiplied by the factor 0.7619”. This capital discount was 
introduced in January 2014 for all EU countries except Spain, which introduced the SF in 
September 2013 through national legislation. The firms that qualify for this capital requirement 
deduction are those with a turnover of below 50 million of Euros. As stated in the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) (2016) report, the purpose of this deduction is to allow credit 
institutions to increase lending to SMEs following the crisis, and to alleviate regulatory changes, 
such as the Capital Conservation Buffer (CCB), that were expected to have a negative impact 
on SME lending. After the implementation of the CCB, banks had to hold a minimum capital 
requirement of 8% plus an additional CCB of 2.5% of their risk weighted exposures. The 
implementation of the SME SF, which is equal to the ratio 8 over 10.5, required that banks held 
a total of 8% of their risk weighted exposures to SME, cancelling out the impact of the CCB. 
The introduction of the SME SF brought about a mechanical increase in the capital 
ratios as a result of applying the deduction on the SME exposures already held by the 
institutions and the new loans granted to SMEs. This means that banks freed up capital 
resources that could be redeployed in the form of new loans. According the EBA (2016) 
estimations, the capital relief resulting from the implementation of the SME SF led to an 
increase of 0.16 percentage points of an average Core Equity Tier 1 ratio of 13.1% and a 
decrease of the minimum capital requirements of EUR 11.7 billion as of the third quarter of 
2015. However, the SF is a temporary measure rather than a permanent mechanism to 
alleviate the effects of lending to SMEs during the crisis and it is intended to be gradually 
withdrawn as the economy recovers. For this reason, it seems necessary to gain a thorough 
understanding of its effects on the credit flows to SMEs. 
Our paper aims to contribute to the discussion on the need and effectiveness of the 
SF on SME lending by answering the following questions. Does the SF reduce the credit 
constraints suffered by the SME to obtain funding? Is the SF more effective for specific types of 
SME? Our analysis based on the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE) 
documents an ease in credit constraints faced by medium-sized firms after the introduction of 
the SF. As a complementary experiment, we conduct an analysis based on Spanish bank-firm 
matched microdata in which the treatment group consists of firms that, according to their 
exposure to each specific bank, are effectively eligible for the application of the SF. Although it 
is restricted to Spain, the unique dataset employed in this analysis enables us to discard the 
effect of potential confounding events. This experiment supports the effectiveness of the SF. 
There is extensive literature studying the effect of capital requirements on bank 
lending. Although higher capital requirements enhance financial stability and make bank lending 
more stable over time, they could also damage credit supply leading to a significant credit 
contraction (Francis and Osborne, 2009; Cosimano and Hakura, 2011; Hyun and Rhee, 2011; 
Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek, 2014; Aiyar et al, 2014; Bridges et al., 2014; Schoenmaker and 
Peek, 2014; Fraisse, Lé, and Thesmar, 2015; Mésonnier and Monks, 2015; De Jonghe, 
Dewachter, and Ongena (2016); among others). At this respect, Fraisse, Lé, and Thesmar 
(2015) report that an increase of one percentage point in capital requirements reduces lending 
by 10% based on loans extended by French banks to French firms over the 2008-2011 period. 
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This effect is especially harmful during the recent crisis and particularly so for small firms, which 
are highly dependent on bank lending, and even more problematic if those firms are dependent 
on banks with low capital ratios and with recorded losses on financial assets (Popov and Udell, 
2012). The scenario we are analyzing is the one in which the SF offers a capital requirement 
deduction from the existing and new loans to SMEs. In this context, we document that banks 
increased lending to a specific segment of SMEs that led to lower capital requirements: 
medium-sized firms. 
Besides the role of capital requirements on lending, there is another line of research 
that examines the impact of capital requirements on bank risk-taking. One stream of this 
literature supports the idea that under certain circumstances capital requirement is effective in 
controlling risk-taking incentives (Furlong and Keeley, 1989; Rochet, 1992; Repullo, 2004). 
More concretely, Berger and Udell (1994) and Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010) note that when 
banks face higher capital requirements they cut lending to the riskier borrowers. De Haan and 
Klomp (2012) find that capital regulation reduces ‘capital and asset risk’ of banks and Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine (2004) document that banks facing more stringent capital regulations have 
fewer nonperforming loans. However, another stream of the literature states that more stringent 
capital regulation may lead to higher bank risk-taking (Blum, 1999) although this could depend 
on the initial capital position of banks and the stringency of the capital rules (Calem and Rob, 
1999). We add to this literature, examining a regulatory change that alleviates banks capital 
ratios and show evidence which suggests that lower capital requirements do not necessarily 
lead to higher risk taking. In fact, we reveal that less stringent capital requirements led to lower 
risk taking given that credit flowed to medium-sized firms, which are known to be less risky 
than micro-small firms (see EBA, 2016). Moreover, credit flowed more to medium-sized firms 
than to other larger firms whose loans were able to benefit from the SF but which were less 
productive than medium-sized firms. 
In 2014, there were 22.3 million active SMEs in the non-financial business sector of 
the European Union (EU). These firms employed almost 90 million people and generated more 
than EUR 3.7 trillion in added value. SMEs can usually only access capital through banks and 
so they are highly vulnerable to banking crises compared to firms with alternative sources of 
capital (Chava and Purnanandam, 2011). This evidence emphasizes the role of SME finance in 
real economic activity and the negative effect that credit rationing could have on it. Thus, 
Duygan-Bump, Levkov, and Montoriol-Garriga (2015) find that small businesses were laying off 
workers in the 2007-2009 recession in the United States due to credit constraints. Given the 
importance of SMEs in the real economy our analysis suggests that the decision to eliminate 
the SF should be carefully reviewed given that its positive effects on SMEs access to funding 
could vanish, ultimately affecting employment and investment. 
The existing evidence on the effectiveness of the SF is rather mixed. EBA (2016) 
conducted an exercise to evaluate the effectiveness of the SF and failed to “identify any 
increase in access to finance for SMEs relative to large firms following the introduction of the 
SME SF”. As a response to the EBA discussion paper, the European Banking Federation (EBF) 
performed a descriptive analysis according to which it is not obvious that the effect of the SF is 
so negligible.1 In this context, our paper studies in detail all the factors associated with the 
implementation of the SF and conducts further and new analyses which provide fresh evidence 
that makes its positive effects on SME lending clearly visible. We document that this effect is 
not consistently positive across the different groups of SMEs due to its heterogeneity. 
Specifically, the SF contributes strongly to alleviating credit rationing faced by medium-sized 
                                                                          
1  The EBF’s message is in line with the one presented in the Bank of Spain Financial Stability Report 05/2014. 
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firms but not by micro/small firms; consistent with the idea that banks optimize their regulatory 
capital by granting loans to those SME that require less capital (i.e., with lower RWA) and 
which, moreover, present less risk.  
From a different angle, Dietsch et al. (2016) find that the SF may be justified for SMEs 
in the Advanced Internal Rating Based (IRBA) corporate exposure class, given that the current 
IRBA calibration is conservative compared to the riskiness of these exposures. The authors find 
that it is also justified under the Standardized Approach (SA) for both corporate and retail 
exposure classes. Our results, complemented with the ones obtained by Dietsch et al. (2016), 
provide detailed evidence supporting the correct functioning of the SF and give support for its 
implementation and maintenance. However, it is essential to monitor its effectiveness to 
understand how it is currently functioning. Some potential variations could be considered 
based on the firms to which it applies. In addition, further measures are needed to guarantee 
the extension of lending to all types of SMEs (i.e., not only medium-sized firms). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data 
and the main variables employed in our analysis. Sections 3 and 4 present the methodology 
and the results, for different identification strategies, on the impact of the SF on SME lending. 
Section 5 contains the results for an experiment based on Spanish bank-firm level  
data. Section 6 concludes. 
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2  Data 
Our primary dataset is the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE) that is 
conducted on behalf of the European Commission (EC) and the European Central Bank (ECB). 
The microdata for the SAFE are collected through a survey of companies in the European 
Union and contain comparable, timely, and frequent data on the access to finance of these 
enterprises. This survey has been available since 2009 on a semiannual basis being the first 
wave of the survey held in June-July 2009. The SAFE is run by the ECB every six months for a 
limited number of euro area countries (12 countries)2 whereas the more comprehensive survey, 
run in cooperation with the EC, covers all EU countries plus some neighboring countries 
totaling 28 countries.3 The survey that covers all EU countries was initially conducted every two 
years (in the first half of 2009 and 2011) but since the first half of 2013 it has been conducted 
once a year, in October, whereas the ECB round is conducted around April. Each wave of the 
survey collects information on the funding needs and financing constraints faced by micro, 
small, medium-sized and large firms during the six months under study. In fact, large firms 
were included to make it possible to compare developments for SMEs with those for large 
enterprises. The firms in the sample are selected randomly and the sample is stratified by 
country, enterprise size class and economic activity. The number of firms in each of these 
strata was adjusted to increase the accuracy of the survey across activities and size classes. 
Moreover, the survey provides weights to guarantee that the proportions of each type of firm in 
terms of their size, industry and country are similar to their economic weight, which is 
measured based on the number of persons employed.4  
2.1  Sample selection 
The baseline analysis focuses on those firms that applied for a loan or for a credit line (or both) 
in the six months prior to the survey date. Thus, we exclude those firms answering that did not 
apply for a loan or credit line, reject them because they are too costly, or those for which the 
resolution is still pending or missing.5 This is to guarantee that our analysis evaluates the effects 
of the SF implementation exclusively from the supply side rather on self-rationing. 
Given that the SME SF was implemented in early 2014 in all EU countries, apart from 
Spain (September 2013), our baseline sample consists of EU countries among which Spain is not 
included (EU-27). This sample consists of two waves: the ninth wave that covers the pre-SF 
period (April – September 2013) and the eleventh wave that covers the post-SF period (April – 
September 2014). We exclude Spain from this sample because the SME SF was implemented 
four months earlier than the other EU countries and the eighth and tenth waves (i.e., the waves 
                                                                          
2  The countries covered in the ECB round are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Since 2014 Slovakia has been included in the sample in each survey round, while 
initially it was included only every two years (2009H1, 2011H1 and 2013H1). The smallest countries in the euro area 
(i.e., Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovenia) were excluded because they represent less 
than 3% of the total number of employees in the euro area, which suggests a very marginal impact on the results for 
the euro area as a whole. 
3  The list of countries covered in this round consists of those covered in the ECB round plus the small euro area 
countries plus Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and United 
Kingdom. 
4  For more details see the ECB SAFE-survey methodological information on the survey and user guide for the 
anonymized micro dataset: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/pdf/surveys/sme/methodological_information_survey 
_and_user_guide.pdf?90b92a69548b7bb76fa4fe96f68acdd3. 
5  The detailed question (and answer) of the SAFE questionnaire used to select the firms in the sample is Q7A: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/pdf/surveys/sme/SME_survey_Questionnaire_publication201411.pdf?0bda6a4ff53a
f3a13b781a5abfe6f693. 
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that strictly define the pre- and post-SF period for Spain) are only available for the euro area (EA) 
countries. We exclude the tenth wave because it covers both pre- and post-SF periods. 
The time span used in the baseline sample is determined by the existence of other 
coetaneous events. Besides the effectiveness of the SF, credit supply and credit conditions 
could also be affected by the coetaneous non-standard monetary policies adopted by the 
ECB. Thus, in August 2012, the ECB announced that it would undertake Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT), if certain conditions were met, in secondary sovereign bond markets 
aimed “at safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of the 
monetary policy”. In fact, Ferrando, Popov, and Udell (2016a) find that the ECB’s OMT 
program had an immediate positive impact on access to finance during the first six months 
after its announcement in countries that were affected more severely by the crisis. However, in 
the case that the OMT exhibits a positive effect on bank lending, it should similarly affect SMEs 
and large firms. 
In addition, in 2013, the EU adopted a legislative package to strengthen the regulation 
of the banking sector and to implement the Basel III agreement in the EU legal framework. This 
package applies as of 1 January 2014. The main changes with this package are the ones in the 
level of capital requirements and the quality of capital. Changes related to the quality of capital 
were implemented in 2014 (i.e., in conjunction with the SME SF) while most of the new 
provisions related to the quantity of capital are phased-in between 2016 and 2019. Changes  
in the quality of capital could impact on the bank’s cost of capital, which is directly transferred in 
the form of higher lending rates and lower lending volumes. Although the SME SF and the 
changes in the quality of capital derived from Basel III are introduced simultaneously, they 
cannot be considered as confounding events since: i) their potential impacts on the lending 
volumes go in the opposite direction and ii) the SME SF only affects SME whereas the other 
measure do not target a specific segment of firms. 
Finally, in June 2014, the ECB announced the introduction of the Targeted Longer-
Term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs) whose primary objective was to improve bank lending 
to the euro area’s non-financial private sector. This program was designed in a series of eight 
operations conducted at quarterly intervals starting at the end of September 2014, just at the 
very end of the eleventh wave. As it occurs with the OMT, this program should affect similarly 
both SMEs and large firms. 
The implementation of these additional measures and programs that may have an 
impact on lending could blur the effects associated with the SF and make it difficult to 
disentangle the specific supply side shifts through econometric modelling. For that reason, and 
to avoid the results from being clouded by the role of those measures, we restrict the baseline 
sample and the corresponding analyses to the SAFE waves around the SF (i.e., waves nine 
and eleven). By restricting the sample period to include just the waves immediately before and 
after the SF, we can be confident that the effect identified is that inherent to the SF. In addition, 
we dedicate Section 5 to rule out the possibility that our results are affected by confounding 
effects based on a dataset that contains the monthly outstanding balances of credit that a 
given Spanish firm has in a given Spanish bank.  
In addition and to study the effect of the SF on firms in the EA, we use a second 
sample that consists of firms in 10 EA countries among which Spain is not included for 
comparability reasons (EA-10). In this sample, we also use the ninth and the eleventh waves for 
the pre- and post-SF period, respectively. The set of countries is the same, excluding Spain, 
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used in the EBA (2016) report and in other recent papers that use SAFE to study firm’s access 
to finance such as Casey and O’Toole, (2014) or Ferrando, Popov, and Udell (2016a, 2016b), 
among others. 
Finally and to show that the results are not driven by the exclusion of Spain, we use a 
third sample for an extended analysis of the EA countries among which Spain is now included 
(EA-11). Given that the SF was applied in Spain earlier than in the rest of Europe, we exclude 
the ninth wave for Spain. Thus, to have observations for Spanish firms in the pre-SF period, the 
sample includes the eighth and ninth waves for the pre-SF period (October 2012 – September 
2013) and the eleventh and twelfth waves for the post-SF period (April 2014 – March 2015).  
2.2  Variables and descriptive statistics 
2.2.1  FIRM SIZE 
We classify a given firm as an SME based on the European Commission Recommendation 
2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 according to which the category of SMEs is made up of 
enterprises which employ fewer than 250 persons and have an annual turnover that does not 
exceed EUR 50 million. The SME category is further split into two categories micro/small and 
medium-sized firms. The former category is composed of those enterprises which employ 
fewer than 50 persons and whose annual turnover does not exceed EUR 10 million whereas 
the medium-sized category consists of the rest of the SMEs. The rest of the firms are 
considered as large firms according to this criterion.  
In the application of the SF large firms could benefit from the SF whenever their 
turnover does not exceed EUR 50 million. We exclude those firms from the baseline analysis in 
order to isolate the impact of the SF on SMEs. Otherwise, the treatment group would not be 
formed exclusively by SMEs or the control group would be contaminated by large firms that 
could be potential benefactors of the SF but that exhibit a low turnover. In addition, we exclude 
from the sample all listed firms because they have access to alternative sources of funding and 
those firms for which we do not have information either about the turnover or the number of 
employees and so, cannot be classified according to the size criterion. We deal with those 
large firms with access to the SME SF in Section 3.3.2 and with listed firms in Section 3.3.3 to 
provide further evidence and robustness on the effect of the SME SF. 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the three samples depending on the 
coverage of countries detailed before. The statistics are obtained using weights designed to 
restore the proportions of the economic weight of each size class, economic activity, and 
country. The descriptive statistics are fully consistent across the three samples. Thus, we 
observe that around 70% of the firms in the three alternative samples can be classified as 
SMEs according to the European Commission Recommendation. Around 20% of the firms in 
the three alternative samples can be classified as medium-sized firms while around 50% of the 
firms are micro/ small firms. 
2.2.2  FIRM FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS 
The dependent variable in our analysis (D. Credit Constrained) is a dummy that equals one 
when the firm is constrained and zero otherwise. In line with Casey and O’Toole (2014), we 
consider that a firm is constrained when it applied and tried to negotiate for any loan/credit line 
contract over the past six month and the application was rejected or only received a limited 
part of it (between 1% and 74%). Hence, the unconstrained firms are those companies that 
           BANCO DE ESPAÑA 13   DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1746 
apply for a loan or a credit line and received more than 75% of the amount requested.6 As can 
be observed in Table 1 for the three alternative samples, around 19% of the firms are 
constrained in the three alternative samples. 
We exclude from the sample those firms that: i) refuse the loan/credit line because it 
was too costly; or ii) do not apply for a loan/credit line because of possible rejection. The first 
case refers to those situations in which the bank accepts the loan application but charging an 
interest rate that is supposed to be high according to the firm standards. These firms are not 
necessarily credit constrained and they could reject the loan because their investment 
opportunities do not provide a positive net present value given the interest rate offered by the 
bank. Indeed, only 3% of the companies refused the loan/credit line because it was too costly. 
The second case refers to those firms that do not apply for a loan/credit line because they 
consider that their application will be denied. However, the bank did not reject the credit 
application and our interest is to understand the role of the SF on bank credit supply. 
Moreover, it is very difficult to claim that the SMEs were aware of the existence of the SF, and 
the potential advantages that it could have on their access to credit and their credit supply. 
2.2.3  FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 
The SAFE also provides information on the firm age, its financial autonomy, financial health, 
and ownership. Due to the nature of the information in the survey, firm characteristics are 
identified by means of dummy variables which are denoted with the prefix D. before the 
definition of the variables. 
Thus, we use dummy variables corresponding to four intervals referring to the firm age: 
less than 2 years (D.Age<2), between 2 and 5 years (D.5>Age>2), between 5 and 10 years 
(D.10>Age>5), and more than 10 years (D.Age>10). Besides the firm age, this variable can be 
understood as a proxy for relationship lending since the older firms are more probable to have 
had previous interactions with the bank. The vast majority of firms in the baseline sample (80%) 
were registered more than 10 years ago whereas the proportion of young firms, registered in the 
two years previous to the date in which the survey was conducted, is very low (2%). 
We use two dummy variables that define the nature of the firm: individual or family firm 
(D.Individual or Family Firm) and autonomous (D.Autonomous). The first one distinguishes 
between individual or family firms and other type of firms. The second variable distinguishes 
between autonomous profit-oriented enterprises and subsidiary firms. According to Table 1 
and as expected, given the dominance of SMEs, most of firms in the sample are individual or 
family firms (83%) and autonomous profit-oriented enterprises (90%). 
To control for the firm credit quality we use a series of dummy variables that take value 
one in the case that the firm capital has improved (D. Firm Capital Improved) or the firm 
economic outlook have improved (D. Firm Economic Outlook Improved), and zero otherwise. In 
addition, we use two dummy variables that are equal to one in the case that the firm credit 
history (interest expenses) deteriorates (decreases) and zero otherwise.7 The last two dummy 
variables are denoted as D. Firm Credit History Deteriorated and D. Firm Interest Expenses 
Decreased, respectively. We observe from the three alternative samples that around 30% 
(19%) of firms improved their capital (firm economic outlook) while around 24% of firms 
                                                                          
6  The specific question (and answer) of the SAFE questionnaire used to define the dependent variable is Q7B. 
7  The interest expense is defined as the difference between the interests that the firm pays for its debts minus the 
interest the firm receives for its assets. 
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benefited from lower interest expenses. In addition, only 16% of firms suffered from the 
deterioration of their credit history. 
The SAFE survey also provides information relative to the sector in which the firms 
operate. Firms are classified in four sectors: industry, construction, trade and services. 
According to the published results of the survey for the ninth and eleventh waves, around the 
34% of firms belong to the sector services; industry and trade sectors cover around 27% of 
firms each; while 11% of firms belong to the construction sector. However, in the application of 
the statistical disclosure controls, microdata are anonymized for large firms. Thus, while we 
observe the sector of individual SMEs, this information is not available for large firms. For that 
reason, we do not use the sector in the baseline analysis as an additional control variable in the 
form of fixed effects; given that besides the sectorial effect it could reflect a size effect that is 
the one we aim to capture in our analysis with the variables defined for such purpose.8 
2.2.4  COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS 
We also include a set of country specific variables that enables us to control for the country 
economic activity and the main characteristics of the banking sector. Concretely, the economic 
activity is proxied by the GDP growth and the leverage of the private sector measured through 
the private debt to GDP ratio. The banking sector is characterized in terms of its efficiency 
through the cost-to-income ratio and its riskiness measured from the problem loans to gross 
customer loans. We observe sizeable differences across countries. For example, the leverage 
ratio ranges from 52% (Lithuania) to 328% (Luxembourg), the non-performing loans ratio 
ranges from 1% (Sweden) to 36% (Bulgaria) whereas the efficiency ratio ranges from the 38% 
(Malta) to 94% (Slovenia). 
                                                                          
8  The sector will be employed in a later analysis based on the specific matching estimation technique to confirm the 
robustness of our results to its use. 
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3  The effect of the Supporting Factor on SMEs access to credit as compared  
              to large firms 
In this section we study whether the introduction of the SF contributed to alleviate credit 
constraints faced by SMEs (treatment group) by comparing them to large firms (control group) 
whose credit was not affected by the SF.  
3.1  SMEs versus large firms 
 
Identification strategy 
Our goal is to carry out a formal test to evaluate how the application of the SF leads to a 
change in lending constraints to SMEs as compared to large firms, to which the capital 
discount is not applicable. For that aim we propose a regression analysis in which the 
dependent variable D. Credit Constrained is regressed on a dummy variable denoted as SME 
that takes value one for SMEs (i.e., the group of treated firms) and zero otherwise, a dummy 
that is equal to one after the implementation of the SF (i.e., the treatment) and zero before that 
event, the interaction of these two dummy variables, and a series of firm characteristics, 
country characteristics, and country (j) fixed effects: 
ܦ. ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ	ܥ݋݊ݏݐݎܽ݅݊݁݀௜௝௧
= ߙ + ߚଵܵܯܧ௜ + ߚଶܵܨ௧ + ߚଷܵܯܧ௜ ݔ ܵܨ௧ + ߁ܨ݅ݎ݉ ܥℎܽݎܽܿݐݏ௜௧
+ ߓܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ	ܥℎܽݎܽܿݐݏ௝௧ + ߔ௝ + ߳௜௝௧ 
(1) 
where coefficient ߚଵcan be interpreted as the difference in the probability that SMEs are 
credit constrained as compared to large firms before the introduction of the SF. The 
coefficient ߚଶ	represents the difference in the probability that large firms are credit 
constrained after the introduction of the SF as compared to their state before that event. 
Finally, the coefficient ߚଷ	can be understood as a difference-in-differences estimator and 
can be interpreted as the change in the probability that SMEs are credit constrained after 
the introduction of the SF minus the change in that probability for large firms. Thus, if the 
introduction of the SF contributes to alleviate credit constraints faced by SMEs as 
compared to large firms, the coefficient ߚଷ	should be negative and statistically different 
from zero. 
The characteristics of firm i that appears in the wave conducted at time t include 
age, firm nature, and firm proxies of creditworthiness. The county characteristics refer to 
the economic activity and the banking sector characteristics at time t,9 while the term ߔ௝ 
corresponds to a matrix that contains country fixed effects. The country specific 
variables and the fixed effects help us to control for specific supply factors affecting all 
the firms in a given country. Equation (1) is estimated using a weighted least squares 
(WLS) regression.10 
                                                                          
 9  We consider the whole banking sector of a given country because contrary to the tightening of monetary policy, 
which mainly affects small banks, the tightening of capital requirements reduces the supply of lending by both small 
and large banks (see Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek, 2016).  
10  Other papers based on SAFE survey such as Ferrando, Popov, and Udell (2016a, 2016b) also use weights to obtain 
summary statistics and in their regression analysis. 
         BANCO DE ESPAÑA  16   DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1746 
The standard errors are clustered at country-wave-SME (SME and large firms) level.11 
This methodology enables us to analyze whether the banks changed their loan policy after the 
introduction of the SF, increasing their lending to SMEs as compared to large firms.  
This analysis is similar to the one conducted in the EBA (2016) report on the SME SF. 
EBA’s (2016) differentiates between the EU and EA samples and uses the SAFE database. 
However, there are several differences worth mentioning between our study and that conducted 
by the EBA. One of the differences between the analyses is the time period. While we restrict our 
analysis to the waves before and after the implementation of the SF, the pre-SF period in the EBA 
report consists of all waves from the fifth to the ninth (i.e., April 2011 - September 2013) whereas 
the post-SF period corresponds to the eleventh and twelfth waves (i.e., April 2014 - March 2015). 
The pre-SF used in the EBA report is significantly longer than the one in our study. In addition, the 
period around the SF was especially intense in terms of the use of non-standard measures such 
as the announcement and implementation of the two 3-year Longer-Term Refinancing Operations 
(LTRO) or the announcement of the OMT that could have affected lending activity. A second 
difference is the definition of SMEs given that the EBA (2016) report relies only on the turnover 
criteria. This leads to the inclusion in the group of SMEs of firms that, according to the European 
Commission Recommendation, are large firms (more than 250 employees) but with a turnover of 
lower than 50 million EUR and so, potential beneficiaries of the SF. However, these firms are in 
essence large firms with low turnover and probably are not the best candidates for banks to grant 
loans. In addition, our study differs from the EBA (2016) report in some estimation technicalities.12 
In our view, these differences could cloud the identification of the impact of the SME SF and so, 
could explain any difference in terms of the results obtained in both studies. 
Results 
Table 2 reports the results of the estimation of equation (1). Each column in this table refers to the 
three different samples considered in our analysis: EU-27, EA-10, and EA-11. Independently of 
the sample employed, we find that the coefficient ߚଵ is positive and statistically significant 
confirming that SMEs were significantly more constrained than large firms before the introduction 
of the SF. Moreover, in line with the EBA report, we note that the SME SF did not have a 
significant impact on the SME group as compared to large firms (i.e., ߚଷ is not statistically different 
from zero). The dummy SF itself does not exhibit a statistically significant effect for the first two 
samples which confirms that the SF did not exert a change in the credit constraints faced by large 
firms (i.e., control group). In fact, the loans to large firms do not lead to potential benefits for banks 
derived from the lower capital requirements after the SF. However, the previous dummy variable 
exhibits a statistically significant effect for the sample that consists of EA-11 countries and two 
waves before and after the SF. As discussed in Section 2.1, the use of this sample leads to a pre-
SF period that spans from October 2012 to September 2013, and so, the estimated coefficient is 
affected by the role of the announcement of the OMT that is consistent with a positive impact on 
lending on the three types of firms (i.e., both SMEs and large firms). This result reinforces the 
use of the baseline sample. 
                                                                          
11  Similar results are obtained using robust standard errors, clustered standard errors at country level or country-wave 
level. We opt for the clustered standard errors at country-wave-SME level as the baseline specification following 
Rogers’ (1993) seminal work, which suggests that no cluster should contain more than five per cent of the data. In 
addition, Nichols and Schaffer (2007) suggest that the data should have at least 20 balanced clusters or 50 
reasonably balanced clusters. While in the EU-27 sample the bias of the country cluster standard errors could be 
potentially limited; the bias for the other two samples, with a much lower number of countries, could be especially 
pervasive since any of the above mentioned conditions is satisfied. 
12  In the interest of an easier interpretation of the estimates, our model is formulated as a linear probability model (LPM) 
instead of a probit model as in the EBA report. In this sense, Ai and Norton (2003) document that the magnitude of 
the interaction effect in nonlinear models (e.g., probit model) does not equal the marginal effect of the interaction term, 
and its statistical significance is not calculated by standard software. 
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The coefficients obtained for the control variables also suggest some interesting 
findings. Thus, individual or family firms are significantly more constrained than the rest of firms. 
It is probably due to the reduced size of these firms but also to the existence of informational 
asymmetries that could limit the access to funding. The fact that the access to credit 
significantly improves as the firm becomes older confirms the previous statement given that 
firm age can be considered as a proxy for relationship lending. Certainly, the firm credit quality 
is also an important input for banks given that firms become more constrained as the 
economic outlook or their credit history deteriorates. Most of the country specific factors are 
not significant due to the presence of the country fixed-effects. Only the efficiency variable 
exhibits a positive and significant effect, suggesting that the less efficient banking systems tend 
to restrict credit to a higher extent.  
3.2 Micro/small and medium-sized firms versus large firms. 
 
Identification strategy 
SMEs are not a homogenous group of firms in terms of their size, risk, and profitability among 
other features; neither, consequently, in terms of their access to credit. Thus, Dietsch and 
Petey (2004) show, from a sample of French and German SMEs, that the larger SMEs exhibit a 
lower average default risk and their performance is less sensitive to systematic risk. The SAFE 
does not report information on the firms’ level of risk but contains information on whether the 
firm credit history has deteriorated in the last six months. We find that the percentage of 
micro/small firms in the baseline sample for which credit history deteriorates is higher than the 
one corresponding to medium-sized firms (i.e., 20% vs 12%). Indeed, according to the EBA 
(2016) report, SMEs and large firm’s riskiness show a cyclical pattern. During recessions, the 
indicators deteriorate for all firms, being more severe for small firms than for medium and large 
firms. In addition, micro/small firms are more opaque and have typically less collateral than 
medium-sized corporations (see Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2006). The EBA (2016) report also 
states that medium-sized firms are relatively better performers. This evidence is corroborated 
by Schiffer and Weder (2001) who show that micro/small firms consistently report higher 
growth obstacles than medium-size or large firms. The higher growth obstacles are also more 
constraining for their operation and growth than in the case of medium-size firms (see Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2005).  
Although the group of SMEs is heterogeneous, banks benefit from the SF 
independently of whether they lend to micro/small firms or medium-sized firms. In light of the 
differences between firms’ characteristics depending on their size, it appears plausible that 
banks do not treat micro/small firms as they do medium-sized firms and decide to benefit from 
the lower capital charge offered by the SF by lending to medium-sized firms. This result would 
be consistent with Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Maksimovic (2006), who find that the 
micro/small firms have more financing obstacles than medium-sized firms. For this reason, it 
seems relevant to make a distinction between different types of SMEs.  
We modify equation (1) by splitting the treatment group of SMEs into two dummy 
variables depending on whether the firms are micro/small firms or medium-sized firms plus 
their interaction with the SF. We propose the following specification to disentangle the effect of 
the SF on the two groups of SMEs: 
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ܦ. ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ	ܥ݋݊ݏݐݎܽ݅݊݁݀௜௝௧
= ߙ + ߚଵܯ݅ܿݎ݋/݈݈ܵ݉ܽ௜ + ߚଶܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉௜ + ߚଷܯ݅ܿݎ݋/݈݈ܵ݉ܽ௜	ݔ	ܵܨ௧
+ ߚସܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉௜	ݔ	ܵܨ௧ + ߚହܵܨ௧ + ߁ܨ݅ݎ݉	ܥℎܽݎܽܿݐݏ௜௧
+ ߓܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ ܥℎܽݎܽܿݐݏ௝௧ + ߔ௝ + ߳௜௝௧ 
(2) 
where the coefficients ߚଵ	and ߚଶ	can be interpreted as the difference in the probability that 
micro/small and medium-sized firms, respectively, are credit constrained as compared to large 
firms before the introduction of the SF. The coefficients ߚଷ	and ߚସ can be interpreted as the 
change in the probability that micro/small and medium-sized firms, respectively, are credit 
constrained after the introduction of the SF minus the change in that probability for large firms. 
Thus, if the introduction of the SF contributes to alleviate credit constraints faced by 
micro/small (medium-sized) firms, the coefficient ߚଷ (ߚସ) should be negative and statistically 
different from zero. Equation (2) is estimated using a WLS regression with standard errors 
clustered at country-wave- size (micro/small, medium and large firms) level. 
Results 
Table 3 reports the results for the estimation of equation (2) for the three alternative samples: i) 
EU-27 countries (column (1)); ii) EA-10 countries (column (2)); iii) EA-11 using two waves to define 
the pre- and two waves to define the post-SF period (column (3)). We find that both micro/small 
and medium-sized firms were significantly more credit constrained than large firms before the 
introduction of the SF. However, credit rationing seems to be more severe for micro/small firms. 
These results are consistent for the three samples employed in our analysis. Specifically, when we 
use the EU-27 sample, the likelihood that micro/small firms face credit constraints before the 
introduction of the SF is about 10% higher than for large firms whereas it is around 6.6% higher in 
the case of the other group of SMEs (i.e., medium-sized firms). This finding is in line with the fact 
that micro/small firms are riskier than medium firms, and hence, they are not treated equally to 
medium-sized firms by banks. However, we find that after the introduction of the SF, medium-
sized firms are significantly less constrained than before the introduction of this policy. In fact, the 
probability of being credit constrained for medium-sized firms is 5% lower after the 
implementation of the SF, as compared to large firms. On the contrary, micro/small firms do not 
undergo a significant change with regard to the pre-SF period.13 
All these findings support the idea that banks tend to use the capital relief from the 
implementation of the SF to grant more loans exclusively to medium-sized firms but not to the 
whole spectrum of SMEs. The lower riskiness of medium-sized firms suggests that lower 
capital requirements do not necessarily lead to an increase in banks’ risk-taking.  
We next test whether the probability that micro/small and medium-sized firms are 
credit constrained after the introduction of the SF is higher/lower than the probability that large 
firms are constrained after the same policy event. That is, whether the SF led banks to treat 
micro/small and medium-sized firms similarly to large firms after this policy event. To this end, 
we conduct an F-test to evaluate whether the linear combination of the coefficients obtained for 
the dummy variables referring to the two types of SMEs and for their interactions with the SF 
dummy are statistically different from zero (i.e., the combination of ߚଵ and ߚଷ	in equation (2) for 
micro/small firms and ߚଶ	and ߚସ	for medium-sized firms).  
                                                                          
13  We have considered as an alternative definition of credit constraints a dummy that is equal to one when the company 
does not apply for a loan/credit line because of possible rejection. Consistent with these arguments, we find that 
there are not significant changes in the decision of not applying because of possibly rejection after the implementation 
of the SF. 
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Table 4 reports the linear combination of those coefficients. We observe that after the 
implementation of the SF, there are no significant statistical differences between medium and 
large firms in terms of credit constraints due to the beneficial effect that the SF had on the 
former. On the contrary, micro/small firms continue to be more constrained than large firms. In 
fact, the order of magnitude of the credit constraints suffered by micro/small firms before and 
after the appearance of the SF, as compared to large firms; are of a similar order of magnitude.  
3.3  Additional evidence on the role of the Supporting Factor 
In this subsection we provide additional evidence on how the application of the SF leads to a 
change in lending constraints to micro/small and medium-sized firms as compared to large 
firms. We first try to disentangle the effect of the SF being dependent on the loan size given 
that the SF is only applied when the exposure of the bank to the firm is below a given 
threshold. Second, in a separate analysis, we deal with those large firms with access to the 
SME SF (i.e., firms with more than 250 employees but with a turnover of below 50 million). 
Third, in a separate analysis, we examine the effect of the SF on listed firms that can obtain 
funding through financial markets. 
3.3.1  DEALING WITH LOAN SIZE RESTRICTIONS  
Identification strategy 
One may argue that previous results should be interpreted with caution given that it is not 
possible to identify exactly which SMEs benefited from the existence of the SME SF. To be able 
to benefit, the total amount owed to the lending institution should not exceed EUR 1.5 million. 
In the previous analysis we assumed that all loans granted to SMEs could benefit from the SME 
SF but this is not the case if the exposition exceeds that amount.  
For the eleventh wave onwards (i.e., post-SF period) the SAFE includes a question 
relative to the requested loan amounts. The answer refers to several intervals of the loan size. The 
EUR 1-million-threshold is the one corresponding to the highest interval.14 15 Around 4% (0.7%) of 
medium-sized (micro/small) firms apply for a loan that amounted to more than EUR 1 million. The 
implicit assumption is that any given bank receiving a loan application for more than EUR 1 million 
is more likely to have a total exposure to that firm, in case the loan is finally granted, that exceeds 
the maximum exposition to be able to benefit from the SME SF (i.e., EUR 1.5 million). Given that 
SMEs totally depend on bank funding, it is reasonable to assume that those SMEs applying for a 
loan of more than EUR 1 million could have other loans with the same bank. 
We now go one step further and extend equation (2) by splitting the micro/small and 
the medium categories for the post-SF period into two groups depending on whether they 
apply for a loan that exceeds EUR 1 million. The control group remains unchanged and 
consists of large firms that did not benefit from the SF: 
                                                                          
14  Firms should choose between the following intervals: i) up to EUR 25,000; ii) more than EUR 25,000 and up to EUR 
100,000; iii) more than EUR 100,000 and up to EUR 250,000; iv) more than EUR 250,000 and up to EUR 1 million; v) 
over EUR 1 million. 
15  In addition, the ninth wave of the SAFE contains a related question about the size of the last loan that the firm has 
obtained in the last two years. However, we do not use this variable because, contrary to the other questions, it 
applies to the previous two years and so, does not necessarily refer to the loan described in the survey that applies to 
applications during the last six months. 
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ܦ. ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ	ܥ݋݊ݏݐݎܽ݅݊݁݀௜௝௧
= ߙ + ߚଵܯ݅ܿݎ݋/݈݈ܵ݉ܽ௜ + ߚଶܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉௜ + ߚଷܯ݅ܿݎ݋/݈݈ܵ݉ܽ > €1ܯ௜ݔܵܨ௧
+ ߚସܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉ > €1ܯ௜ݔܵܨ௧ + ߚହܯ݅ܿݎ݋/݈݈ܵ݉ܽ < €1ܯ௜ݔܵܨ௧
+ ߚ଺ܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉ < €1ܯ௜ݔܵܨ௧ + ߚ଻ܵܨ௧ + ߁ܨ݅ݎ݉	ܥℎܽݎܽܿݐݏ௜௧
+ ߓܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ	ܥℎܽݎܽܿݐݏ௝௧ + ߔ௝ + ߳௜௝௧ 
(3) 
where ܯ݅ܿݎ݋/݈݈ܵ݉ܽ	 > ܧܷܴ1ܯ௜ݔ	ܵܨ௧	ܽ݊݀	ܯ݅ܿݎ݋/݈݈ܵ݉ܽ < ܧܷܴ1ܯ௜ݔ	ܵܨ௧	ܽ݊݀	ܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉ < ܧܷܴ1ܯ௜ݔ	ܵܨ௧ 
are two dummy variables that are equal to one if a micro/small or medium-sized firm, respectively, 
applied for a loan of more (less) than EUR 1 million after the introduction of the supporting factor, 
and zero otherwise. The coefficients of interest ߚଷ	and ߚସ (ߚହ	and ߚ଺) can be interpreted as the 
change in the probability that micro/small and medium-sized firms, respectively, that requested a 
loan of more (less) than EUR 1 million are credit constrained after the introduction of the SF minus 
the change in that probability for large firms. In case the lower credit constraints faced by medium-
sized firms after the implementation of the SF is due to that policy event, the coefficient ߚ଺	should be 
negative and statistically different from zero whereas ߚସ	should not. 
Results 
The results obtained from the estimation of equation (3) are contained in Table 5. In line with 
our expectations, those SMEs that apply for a loan after the introduction of the SF that exceeds 
EUR 1 million do not experience an improvement in their access to credit as compared to large 
firms. Indeed, we observe that access to credit of those micro/small sized firms that apply for a 
loan above the EUR 1-million-threshold significantly worsens. Moreover, medium-sized firms 
with loan applications below EUR 1 million were less likely to be constrained after the policy 
event, as compared to large firms, whereas the other medium-sized firms with applications 
above that amount were not. This result supports the effectiveness of the SF but could be also 
linked to the regulatory treatment of SMEs with high credit exposition. Bank credit to SMEs can 
be classified as retail or corporate depending on whether the exposition is below or above EUR 
1 million threshold.16 According to the EBA report (2013) on risk weighted assets (RWA), the 
average risk weights applied to SME retail exposures are significantly smaller than the ones 
applied to SME corporate exposures. Either from the side of the SF or from that of the firm 
classification as a retail or corporate institution, the results confirm that banks optimize their 
regulatory capital by granting loans to those SMEs that require less capital (i.e., with lower 
RWA) and that, in addition, are less risky.  
3.3.2 DEALING WITH LARGE FIRMS WITH ACCESS TO THE SUPPORTING FACTOR 
Identification strategy 
For a proper design of the identification strategy, we have excluded from the analysis those firms 
that can be considered as large firms according to the definition used by the European 
Commission (more than 250 employees) but with a turnover of below EUR 50 million and hence, 
are potential beneficiaries from the SF. We now extend the sample with this group of firms and 
estimate a variation of equation (2) in which we add a dummy variable for this specific group of 
firms and its interaction with the SF dummy. The control group remains unchanged and consists 
of large firms that did not benefit from the SF (i.e., turnover higher than EUR 50 million): 
 
                                                                          
16  This regulatory treatment was in force before the introduction of the SME SF. 
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ܦ. ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ	ܥ݋݊ݏݐݎܽ݅݊݁݀௜௝௧
= ߙ + ߚଵܯ݅ܿݎ݋/݈݈ܵ݉ܽ௜ + ߚଶܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉௜ + ߚଷܮܽݎ݃݁ ݓ/ܵܨ௜
+ ߚସܯ݅ܿݎ݋/݈݈ܵ݉ܽ௜ݔܵܨ௧ + ߚହܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉௜ݔܵܨ௧ + ߚ଺ܮܽݎ݃݁	ݓ/ܵܨ௜ݔܵܨ௧
+ ߚ଻ܵܨ௧ + ߁ܨ݅ݎ݉ ܥℎܽݎܽܿݐݏ௜௧ + ߓܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ ܥℎܽݎܽܿݐݏ௝௧ + ߔ௝ + 	߳௜௝௧ 
(4) 
where Large	w/SFi	 is a dummy variable that is equal to one for those large firms according to 
the European Commission definition (i.e., more than 250 employees) but with a turnover lower 
than 50 million EUR and so, affected by the SF. The coefficients of interest ߚସ, ߚହ, and ߚ଺	can 
be interpreted as the change in the probability that micro/small, medium, and large firms 
affected by the SF, respectively, are credit constrained after the introduction of the SF minus 
the change in that probability for large firms not affected by the SF. In agreement with the 
previous evidence, the coefficient ߚହ	should be negative and statistically different from zero. 
Regarding the coefficient associated to the new group of firms (i.e., Large	w/SFi ), a negative 
and significant effect would indicate that, as it occurs with medium-sized firms, the SF have 
contributed to alleviate their constraints. 
Results 
Results are shown in Table 6. We reveal that large firms affected by the SME SF were more 
constrained than other large firms with a higher turnover before the establishment of the SME 
SF. This suggests the existence of good lending practices given that these firms exhibit a lower 
productivity per employee than other large firms. This low productivity is also decisive in 
understanding the role that the SF has on this type of firms given that it does not contribute to 
improving their lending conditions as compared to large firms. Not surprisingly, banks seem to 
prefer lending to medium-sized firms with a lower operating leverage such that they require a 
lower number of employees to obtain a similar level of turnover. It confirms that credit flowed in 
the right direction and the banks considered the quality of the firm to which they were lending 
within the group of firms that could lead to lower capital requirements. 
3.3.3  DEALING WITH LISTED SMES 
Identification strategy 
Some of the firms included in the SAFE are listed firms. The type of market in which they are 
listed is not specified but among the listed firms there are SMEs. The number of listed SMEs is 
very small: 105 and 70 in the waves immediately before and after the SME SF, respectively. 
This offers a proper opportunity to analyze whether the SME SF had any effect on these firms 
and more importantly, whether the exclusion of these firms under the argument that they can 
obtain funding in financial markets is convincing. Thus, we now extend the sample with the 
group of listed SMEs (Listed SME) and estimate a variation of equation (2) in which we add a 
dummy variable for this specific group of firms and its interaction with the SF dummy. 
ܦ. ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ	ܥ݋݊ݏݐݎܽ݅݊݁݀௜௝௧
= ߙ + ߚଵܯ݅ܿݎ݋/݈݈ܵ݉ܽ௜ + ߚଶܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉௜ + ߚଷܮ݅ݏݐ݁݀ ܵܯܧ௜
+ ߚସܯ݅ܿݎ݋/݈݈ܵ݉ܽ௜ݔܵܨ௧ + ߚହܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉௜ݔܵܨ௧ + ߚ଺ܮ݅ݏݐ݁݀ܵܯܧ௜ݔܵܨ௧
+ ߚ଻ܵܨ௧ + ߁ܨ݅ݎ݉ ܥℎܽݎܽܿݐݏ௜௧ + ߓܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ ܥℎܽݎܽܿݐݏ௝௧ + ߔ௝ + 	߳௜௝௧ 
(5) 
where ܯ݅ܿݎ݋/݈݈ܵ݉ܽ௜	and ܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉௜	are two dummy variables that are equal to one if a 
micro/small or medium-sized firm, respectively, is not listed, and zero otherwise. The 
coefficients of interest ߚସ, ߚହ, and ߚ଺	can be interpreted as the change in the probability that 
non-listed micro/small and medium-sized firms and listed SMEs, respectively, are credit 
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constrained after the introduction of the SF minus the change in that probability for large firms. 
In agreement with the previous evidence, the coefficient ߚହ	should be negative and statistically 
different from zero. The coefficient ߚ଺ associated to the effect of the SF on the listed SMEs 
would indicate whether this policy measure was also effective for firms that do not depend 
exclusively on banks to have access to funding. 
Results 
Results for the corresponding estimation can be found in Table 7. Contrary to the results 
obtained for non-listed SMEs, listed SMEs were not significantly more constrained than large 
firms before the introduction of the SF. Listed SMEs may be more financially sound and 
transparent than other SMEs since being listed involves the disclosure of much more 
information. Although in view of column (1) of Table 7, and as expected, one observes a 
negative coefficient for the interaction of the dummy variables corresponding to listed SMEs 
and SF, it is not significantly different from zero. The introduction of the SF does not affect the 
degree of financial constraints faced by the listed SMEs compared to large firms because they 
were already treated similarly before that event. In the case of non-listed micro/small and 
medium-sized firms, the results are similar to those obtained in the baseline analyses. 
Another interesting feature of the SF is also revealed here; it is especially positive and effective 
for those SMEs that did not have access to alternative sources of funding and for which bank 
loans are the only source for carrying out further investments. This supports the implementation 
of the SF and advocates the need for a proper analysis to deal with the situation of SMEs in 
order to define the optimal date for its withdrawal. 
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4  The effect of the Supporting Factor on access to credit within each group 
              of firms 
In this section we provide two additional pieces of evidence based on the direct comparison of 
similar types of firms before and after the event. It helps us to confirm that the lower credit 
constraints faced by medium-sized firms after January 2014, as previously documented, are 
due to the introduction of the SF and not to other economic conditions that may have affected 
median and large firms differently, with knock-on effects to loan application success. 
4.1  Analysis based on the nearest neighbor matching technique 
We first complement the previous results with an analysis based on the specific matching 
estimation technique developed in Abadie and Imbens (2002). This technique implements a 
nearest neighbor matching estimation for average treatment effects. The goal of this analysis 
is to estimate the average effect of the SME SF on the lending constraints. To this end, we 
compare outcomes between treated and control observations using the nearest neighbor 
matching approach across time-invariant firm characteristics, which are unrelated to the 
application of the SF. For each group size, we implement exact matching in terms of the 
country in which the firm is located, the sector, and two dummy variables: one that indicates 
whether the firm is an individual/family firm or not and another one indicating whether the 
firm is autonomous or not. Note that the information on the sector of the firm is only available 
for SMEs and so could not be used in the previous analyses because the control group 
consisted of large firms for which this information is not reported. Additionally, firms are 
matched using the nearest neighbor in terms of their age. Thus, by means of this technique 
we compare firms that are similar across several dimensions and only differ in the date in 
which they appear in the survey and apply for a loan: before or after the appearance of the 
SME SF. 
Table 8 reports the results of the matching estimation for a sample that covers the 
ninth and the eleventh waves for all the firms located in the European Union (EU-28), except for 
Spain, for which we use the eighth and tenth waves. Given that we match firms that belong to 
the same country before and after the implementation of the SME SF, we can include Spain in 
the analysis.  
Column (1) of Table 8 reports the results for the analysis in which the treated group 
consists of micro/small-sized firms after the implementation of the SME SF whereas the 
control group consists of similar micro/small-sized firms, before the regulatory change. 
Columns (2) – (4) of Table 8 reports the same analysis for medium firms, large firms 
potentially eligible for the SME SF, and large firms that are not eligible, respectively. A 
negative coefficient in Table 8 indicates that the group of firms under study is, on average, 
less credit constrained after the implementation of the SF. When comparing medium-sized 
firms, we observe that they are significantly less constrained following the introduction of the 
SF. However, we do not find significant differences for the group of micro/small firms and the 
two groups of large firms.  
4.2  Analysis based on the baseline specification 
We can also formally check whether the SF helped alleviate the credit constraints faced by 
medium-sized and micro/small firms as compared to the same group of firms, based on the 
results obtained from the estimation of equation (2). The linear combination of coefficients 
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ߚଷ	and ߚହ (ߚସand ߚହ) can be interpreted as the difference in the probability of being credit 
constrained before and after the introduction of the SF in the group of micro/small (medium-
sized) firms. Moreover, coefficient ߚହ	represents the difference in the probability of being 
credit constrained before and after the introduction of the SF in the group of large firms. To 
obtain the difference in the probability of being credit constrained before and after the SF in 
the group of large firms affected by the SF we linearly combine coefficients ߚ଺	and ߚ଻	that 
appear in equation (4). Table 9 contains the previously detailed linear combinations of 
coefficients, their standard errors, and the degree of statistical significance to check whether 
they are statistically different from zero. This test also helps us evaluate the consistency of 
the results obtained from the nearest-neighbor matching methodology. This analysis is 
implemented based on the sample of 27 European countries and so, the coefficients to test 
the magnitude of credit constraints for micro/small, medium-sized, and large firms are 
obtained from column (1) of Table 3 whereas the ones for large firms affected by the SF 
come from column (1) of Table 6.17  
The only significant coefficient for the linear combinations previously detailed is the one 
associated to medium-sized firms confirming that the results obtained under the nearest-
neighbor matching methodology are fully consistent with those obtained under the baseline 
specification. Moreover the only coefficient that is statistically different from zero exhibits an 
identical magnitude to the one reported in Table 8 (i.e., -0.029 vs -0.030, respectively). It 
supports the consistency of both analyses and adds robustness to the results obtained under 
the nearest neighbor matching technique, especially for those types of firms for which there is a 
lower number of observations (i.e., large firms affected and non-affected by the SF). 
                                                                          
17  The samples used in the nearest neighbour matching analysis in Section 4.1 and the baseline analysis whose results 
are used to study the effect of the SF on access to credit for each group of firms in Section 4.2; are slightly different 
because Spain is not included in the latter analysis. However, the Spanish firms represent only around 5% of the 
observations and so, its exclusion in Section 4.1 leads to similar results. 
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5  An additional experiment based on Spanish banks and firms  
Instead of using the SAFE, in this experiment we use two databases at Bank of Spain: the 
Central Credit Register (CIR) and the Integrated Central Balance Sheet Data Office survey (CBI 
by its Spanish name). The CIR contains detailed information on all bank credit to non-financial 
institutions above 6,000 euros such as the size of the credit instrument, the maturity, the 
creditworthiness, or the existence of collateral. Given that we are interested in the total 
exposure of a given bank to each firm to infer whether the new potential credit granted to the 
firm applies for the SF discount, we aggregate the outstanding amount of credit of each firm in 
each bank. Thus, at the end we have information on the total credit committed by each bank to 
each firm in each month, both drawn and undrawn, for several months before and after the 
introduction of the SF in Spain. In addition the CIR includes the fiscal identity of both borrower 
and lender, which enables us to construct a matched bank-firm dataset. 
The CIR is merged with another dataset that is formed by those Spanish non-financial 
firms that respond to the Integrated Central Balance Sheet Data Office Survey (CBI), which 
includes the data reported to the Annual survey and the data from the accounts filed with the 
mercantile registries. The coverage of this dataset is quite extensive18 and contains annual 
information of the firms’ balance-sheets, the sector and the municipality in which the firm 
operates. Given the implementation date of the SF in Spain, we use the balance-sheet 
information available for December 2012. 
The merge of the two datasets enables us to define the exposure of a given bank to 
each firm and also the characteristics of the firm. Thus, we can classify the firms as micro/small 
or medium-sized firms according to the European Commission Recommendation. But more 
importantly, we can now properly define whether each specific bank can benefit from the 
application of the SF to the credit granted to a given firm. A bank can benefit from the use of 
the SF on the lending to a given firm if the previous exposure to that firm is lower than EUR 1.5 
million. Almost all the micro-small firms qualify for the application of the SF by September 2013, 
given that the exposure of the banks to this type of firms was lower than EUR 1.5 million in 
more than 99% of the cases. Since the SF threshold is not binding for the vast majority of this 
type of firms and the ones for which it is, could be highly indebted relative to their size, we 
focus our analysis on medium-sized firms. In this case, the number of bank-firm exposures that 
are above the threshold established in the regulation concerning the SF is not negligible (11%). 
In addition, we restrict our sample to bank-firm total credit exposures that range between EUR 
1 million and EUR 2 million. Our aim is to focus on those firms for which the EUR 1.5 million 
threshold is more likely to be binding. We expect that the distance to the threshold does not 
exhibit any statistically significant effect before the introduction of the SF but it does after this 
date. We end up with 1,961 bank-firm observations to conduct this analysis. 
These datasets enable us to design an optimal experiment in which the treatment and 
the control groups consist of similar firms (medium-sized). Concretely, we propose a regression 
analysis in which the dependent variable (∆Creditij) is the increase (in millions of euros) in the 
total credit committed by bank j to firm i, both drawn and undrawn, from August 2013 (the 
month immediately prior to the introduction of the SF in Spain) to December 2013 (three 
months after the introduction date).  
                                                                          
18  The dataset includes information for more than 700,000 firms for the year used in our analysis. 
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The dependent variable is regressed on a series of control variables and the variable of 
interest that is defined as the maximum between the difference of 1.5 minus the exposure of 
the bank j at the beginning of the period (i.e., August 2013) to a given firm i (in millions of euros) 
and zero (max	(1.5 − ܧݔ݌, 0)): 
Δܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ௜௝ = ߚmax	(1.5 − ܧݔ݌௜௝, 0) + Θܨ௜ + Γܤ௝ + ߞܴܮ௜௝ + ߛ௦,௟ + ߳௜௝ (6) 
where max൫1.5 − ܧݔ݌௜௝, 0൯	is higher than zero in the case that a given firm i represents an 
opportunity for bank j to benefit from the use of the SF (i.e., the exposure of the bank to that 
firm is below EUR 1.5 million on August 2013) and zero otherwise. F_i denotes a matrix of firm 
characteristics, ܤ௝	is a matrix that contains bank characteristics and ܴܮ௜௝	is a proxy for the firm-
bank relationship lending measured from the age of that relationship. The set of firm 
characteristics include measures of leverage (equity over total assets), liquid assets (over total 
assets), profitability (ROA), and size (logarithm of total assets). The set of bank characteristics 
include size (logarithm of total assets); profitability (ROA); risk profile (share of non-performing 
loans and equity over total assets); liquid assets (over total assets); and business model (non-
interest over interest income). Finally, ߛ௦,௟	indicates the use of 3-digit industry-municipality fixed 
effects, respectively. The standard errors are clustered at bank and firm level. 
The coefficient ߚ measures the changes in supply after the introduction of the SF to 
those firms that represent potential opportunities in terms of capital reliefs for the bank. More 
specifically, it measures the increase in credit supply to those firms with an exposure below 
EUR 1.5 million for each euro that the exposure departs from the threshold, compared to those 
firms that do not qualify for the SF because their outstanding credit balance is higher than EUR 
1.5 million.  
The results obtained for this analysis are reported in Column (1) of Table 10. In the 
interest of brevity the coefficients for the control variables are not reported. Consistently with 
previous results, we observe that those medium-sized firms to which the bank had an exposure 
below EUR 1.5 million were more likely to increase their outstanding credit balance after the 
introduction of the SF compared to other medium-sized firms to which the bank had an exposure 
above that threshold. Thus, a bank with an exposure of EUR 1 million to a given firm in August 
2013 increases its exposure by EUR 108,000 (500,000 * 0.216) more than to a firm of similar 
characteristics but that does not qualify for the capital requirement deduction. These results are 
consistent and complement the evidence documented for the European firms. 
Indeed, one may argue that the effect is not specifically due to the SF as one expects 
that the banks aim to limit excessive credit exposures and so, coefficient β in equation (6) could 
be equally positive and statistically significant before the introduction of the SF. For that reason, 
we evaluate the magnitude of the coefficients in a different sample period before the dates 
used to evaluate the effectiveness of the SF. We consider the change in the outstanding 
balances of credit between January 2013 and May 2013. The results obtained under the same 
specification described in equation (6) are reported in column (2). A positive but not statistically 
significant coefficient is obtained in the pre-SF period. The fact that the distance to the 
threshold does not affect to credit supply before the implementation of the SF but that it does 
after this event, confirms the effectiveness of the SF in improving the credit supply to those 
medium-sized firms that offered the opportunity of capital reliefs. 
Although it is restricted to Spain, the dataset employed in this analysis is useful to test 
the effect of potential confounding events. The earlier adoption of the SF in Spain and the use 
of this dataset enable us to design an experiment through which we can isolate more efficiently 
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the effect of the SF from that of other coinciding events such as the announcement of the 
TLTRO in June 2014 (and its later implementation in September 2014) or the introduction of 
the CRR/CRD IV in January 2014, which might hamper the identification of this effect. The 
analysis around the introduction of the SF is based on the variation of credit from August 2013 
to December 2013. Although the previous period is prior to any of two potential confounding 
events, we perform an additional analysis in which we shorten the length of the time interval 
around the implementation of the SF in Spain (September 2013). The results are reported in 
Table 11. The first column corresponds to the baseline analysis (August – December 2013) and 
is included in the interest of comparability. Column (2) in Table 11 corresponds to the case in 
which the dependent variable is the increase (in millions of euros) in the outstanding credit 
balance of a given bank to a firm from August to November 2013 whereas column (3) contains 
the results for the variation in credit between August and October. The coefficient of interest 
decreases as the time interval shortens but it is positive and statistically significant for any of 
the three intervals around the policy event. It suggests that the results are not driven by the 
potential confounding events. 
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6  Conclusions 
The introduction of the SME SF allows banks to reduce capital requirements for credit risk on 
exposures to firms with a turnover below EUR 50 million. This means that banks freed up capital 
resources that can be redeployed in the form of new loans. The SF is a temporary measure rather 
than a permanent mechanism to alleviate the effects of lending to SMEs during the crisis and it is 
intended to be gradually withdrawn as the economy recovers. In this context, our paper aims to 
contribute to the discussion on the need and effectiveness of the SF on SME lending.  
Our study documents that the SF alleviates credit rationing to medium-sized firms with 
access to the SF (i.e., with loans from a given bank that amount to less than EUR 1.5 million) 
but not to micro/small firms. Banks seem to differentiate between medium- and micro/small-
sized firms, probably because the latter are riskier and could lead to higher costs of absorbing 
potential losses, to the extent that only the former benefit from the improvement in credit 
supply. Several extensions are used to isolate the effects of the SF on SME lending and make 
them clearly visible.  
These results suggest that European banks have been aware of this policy measure 
and have optimized both their regulatory capital and their credit exposures by granting loans to 
the safest SMEs. However, the context of regulatory uncertainty about the duration of this 
policy measure could damage its effectiveness. Banks might be limiting their lending to SMEs 
that benefit from the SF if the duration of this measure is uncertain given that the withdrawal of 
this measure could mechanically increase their RWA, and lead them to require more capital in 
order to accommodate the regulatory ratios. Moreover, it seems necessary to monitor its 
effectiveness over time to improve our understanding and, probably, to consider potential 
variations. These variations should be devoted to guarantee a proper credit allocation to all 
types of SMEs (i.e., not only medium-sized firms). 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics obtained using weights designed to restore the proportions of the economic weight of each size class, economic activity and country. 
We provide the number of observations (N), the mean, standard deviation (SD), minimum (Min) and maximum (Max). We report the statistics for three samples: i) EU-27 refers 
to the European Union countries (without Spain) for the ninth and eleventh waves (i.e., April 2013 to September 2013 and April 2014 to September 2014); ii) EA-10 refers to 
ten Euro Area countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Portugal) for the ninth and eleventh waves (i.e., April 2013 to 
September 2013 and April 2014 to September 2014);iii) EA-11 refers to eleven Euro Area countries (EA-10 and Spain) for the eighth, ninth, eleventh and twelfth waves (i.e., 
October 2012 to September 2013 and April 2014 to March 2015). 
  EU-27 EA-10 EA-11 (2 Waves) 
              Variable  N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max 
D. Credit Constrained  6015 0.18 0.38 0 1 3694 0.19 0.39 0 1 8268 0.19 0.40 0 1 
   
D. Micro or Small Firm  6015 0.48 0.50 0 1 3694 0.49 0.50 0 1 8268 0.50 0.50 0 1 
D. Medium Firm  6015 0.24 0.43 0 1 3694 0.21 0.41 0 1 8268 0.22 0.41 0 1 
D. Large Firm  6015 0.28 0.45 0 1 3694 0.30 0.46 0 1 8268 0.28 0.45 0 1 
   
D. Individual or Family Firm  6015 0.83 0.38 0 1 3694 0.85 0.35 0 1 8268 0.83 0.37 0 1 
D. Autonomous 6015 0.90 0.29 0 1 3694 0.92 0.28 0 1 8268 0.91 0.29 0 1 
D. Age >10  6015 0.80 0.40 0 1 3694 0.82 0.39 0 1 8268 0.83 0.38 0 1 
D. 10>Age>5  6015 0.13 0.33 0 1 3694 0.12 0.33 0 1 8268 0.12 0.32 0 1 
D. 5>Age>2  6015 0.05 0.22 0 1 3694 0.04 0.20 0 1 8268 0.04 0.20 0 1 
D. Firm Capital Improved  6015 0.34 0.47 0 1 3694 0.32 0.47 0 1 8268 0.32 0.47 0 1 
D. Firm Economic Outlook Improved  6015 0.19 0.39 0 1 3694 0.15 0.36 0 1 8268 0.21 0.41 0 1 
D. Firm Credit History Deteriorated  6015 0.16 0.36 0 1 3694 0.18 0.38 0 1 8268 0.18 0.39 0 1 
D. Firm Interest Expenses Decreased 6015 0.24 0.43 0 1 3694 0.26 0.44 0 1 8268 0.28 0.45 0 1 
   
Problem Loans/ Gross Customer Loans (%)  6015 8.74 7.63 1.17 36.25 3694 7.47 6.05 1.52 35.04 8268 8.08 5.95 1.35 35.31 
GDP Growth (%)  6015 0.69 1.41 -3.20 5.20 3694 0.18 1.11 -3.20 5.20 8268 0.40 1.29 -3.20 5.20 
Private Sector Debt to GDP (%)  6015 126.71 37.67 52.30 327.90 3694 129.14 31.80 99.50 266.70 8268 132.42 32.30 98.90 266.70 
Cost-to-Income Ratio (%)  6015 66.37 7.43 37.38 94.00 3694 68.33 4.63 56.79 91.77 8268 66.53 6.46 51.45 91.77 
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Table 2: Effect of the Supporting Factor on the SME access to credit  
as compared to large firms 
Table 2 reports the WLS estimates of equation (1) for the three periods detailed in Table 1. The 
dependent variable (D. Credit Constrained) is a dummy that equals one when the firm applies for 
a loan or credit line and receives less than 75% of the requested amount (including the total 
rejection). The variable takes zero whenever the firm applies for a loan and receives more than the 
75%. The variables of interest are: D. SME, D. After SF and D.SME x D. After SF. D.SME is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is an SME and zero otherwise. D.After SF is a 
dummy variable that takes value one after the implementations of the SME SF and zero before. 
D.SME x D. After SF is the interaction of the two previous dummy variables. The set of control 
variables is self-explanatory in the way they are labeled. Standard errors are clustered at country-
wave-SME (SME and large firms) level and are reported in brackets.*, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
EU-27 EU-10 
EU-11          
(2-Waves) 
D. SME 0.088*** 0.076*** 0.086*** 
[0.021] [0.023] [0.015] 
D. SME x D. After SF -0.023 -0.012 -0.017 
[0.028] [0.034] [0.020] 
D. After SF 0.026 0.033 0.038* 
[0.026] [0.033] [0.019] 
D. Individual or Family Firm 0.032** 0.038** 0.013 
[0.014] [0.018] [0.015] 
D. Autonomous -0.015 -0.027 -0.016 
[0.020] [0.025] [0.017] 
D. Age >10 -0.217*** -0.232** -0.137* 
[0.077] [0.100] [0.072] 
D. 10>Age>5 -0.162** -0.165* -0.092 
[0.071] [0.093] [0.066] 
D. 5>Age>2 -0.099 -0.122 -0.040 
[0.085] [0.113] [0.079] 
D. Firm Capital Improved -0.030** -0.027* -0.003 
[0.012] [0.015] [0.012] 
D. Firm Economic Outlook Improved -0.050*** -0.057*** -0.083*** 
[0.015] [0.019] [0.014] 
D. Firm Credit History Deteriorated 0.183*** 0.177*** 0.189*** 
[0.019] [0.021] [0.018] 
D. Firm Interest Expenses Decreased -0.060*** -0.069*** -0.065*** 
[0.015] [0.020] [0.013] 
Problem Loans/ Gross Customer Loans (%) 0.004 -0.006 -0.004 
[0.012] [0.021] [0.005] 
GDP Growth (%) 0.013 0.014 0.011 
[0.014] [0.041] [0.015] 
Private Sector Debt to GDP (%) 0.003 -0.000 0.003 
[0.003] [0.008] [0.003] 
Cost-to-Income Ratio (%) 0.004** 0.002 0.004** 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Observations 6,015 3,694 8,268 
R-squared 0.134 0.145 0.141 
Country FE YES YES YES 
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Table 3: Effect of the Supporting Factor on medium, micro/small firms’  
access to credit as compared to large firms 
Table 3 reports the WLS estimates of equation (2) for the three periods detailed in Table 1. The 
novelty with respect to Table 2 is the substitution of D. SME by two dummy variables 
depending on the SME size: D. Micro or Small firm and D. Medium firm. D. Micro or Small firm 
(D. Medium firm) is a dummy variable that takes value one if the firm is a micro/small (medium-
sized) and zero otherwise. In addition, Table 3 includes the coefficients for the interaction of the 
two previous dummy variables with D. After SF. The set of control variables is self-explanatory 
in the way they are labeled. Standard errors are clustered at country-wave-SME size (i.e., 
micro/small, medium and large firms) level and are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
(1) (2) (3) 
  EU-27 EU-10 
EU-11          
(2-Waves) 
D. Micro or Small Firm 0.105*** 0.086*** 0.102*** 
[0.025] [0.026] [0.017] 
D. Medium Firm 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.069*** 
[0.020] [0.021] [0.016] 
D. Micro or Small Firm x D. After SF -0.005 0.015 -0.000 
[0.030] [0.034] [0.020] 
D. Medium Firm x D. After SF -0.053** -0.067** -0.050** 
[0.027] [0.030] [0.020] 
D. After SF 0.024 0.032 0.038** 
[0.025] [0.031] [0.018] 
D. Individual or Family Firm 0.023 0.031* 0.006 
[0.014] [0.018] [0.014] 
D. Autonomous -0.023 -0.036 -0.022 
[0.019] [0.024] [0.017] 
D. Age >10 -0.204*** -0.220** -0.125* 
[0.076] [0.099] [0.071] 
D. 10>Age>5 -0.157** -0.159* -0.087 
[0.070] [0.091] [0.065] 
D. 5>Age>2 -0.100 -0.122 -0.039 
[0.084] [0.112] [0.078] 
D. Firm Capital Improved -0.026** -0.023 0.001 
[0.012] [0.015] [0.012] 
D. Firm Economic Outlook Improved -0.049*** -0.058*** -0.080*** 
[0.015] [0.018] [0.014] 
D. Firm Credit History Deteriorated 0.180*** 0.174*** 0.187*** 
[0.019] [0.021] [0.018] 
D. Firm Interest Expenses Decreased -0.057*** -0.066*** -0.061*** 
[0.015] [0.020] [0.013] 
Problem Loans/ Gross Customer Loans (%) 0.003 -0.009 -0.005 
[0.010] [0.017] [0.006] 
GDP Growth (%) 0.013 0.016 0.011 
[0.013] [0.037] [0.014] 
Private Sector Debt to GDP (%) 0.003 0.000 0.003 
[0.003] [0.008] [0.002] 
Cost-to-Income Ratio (%) 0.004** 0.003 0.004** 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Observations 6,015 3,694 8,268 
R-squared 0.138 0.150 0.145 
Country FE YES YES YES 
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Table 4: Effect of the Supporting Factor on medium, micro/small firms’  
access to credit as compared to large firms (cont'd) 
Table 4 reports the linear combination of the coefficients obtained for the dummy variables referring 
to the two types of SMEs and for their interactions with the SF dummy, which are reported in Table 
3. These linear combinations enable us to test whether the probability that micro/small and 
medium-sized firms are credit constrained after the introduction of the SF is higher/lower than the 
probability that large firms are constrained after the same policy event. To this end, we conduct an 
F-test to evaluate whether the linear combination of the coefficients are statistically different from 
zero. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
  EU-27 EU-10 
EU-11       
(2-Waves) 
Ho: B[Median] + B[Median x SF]=0 0.013 -0.003 0.020 
[0.019] [0.022] [0.014] 
Ho: B[MS] + B[MSxSF]=0 0.100*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 
  [0.022] [0.027] [0.016] 
Observations 6,015 3,694 8,268 
R-squared 0.138 0.150 0.145 
Country FE YES YES YES 
 
Table 5: Effect of the Supporting Factor on the SME access to credit  
depending on the loan size as compared to large firms 
Table 5 reports the WLS estimates of equation (3) for the three periods detailed in Table 1. The 
novelty with respect to Table 3 is that the variables relative to the SME size (i.e., micro-small and 
medium) are split into two for the post-SF period depending on whether the firm has applied for a 
loan that exceeds EUR 1 million. The estimates for the control variables are not reported in the 
interest of brevity. Standard errors are clustered at country-wave-SME size (i.e., micro/small, 
medium and large firms) levels and are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
  (1) (2) (3) 
  EU-27 EA-10 
EU-11        
(2-Waves) 
D. Micro or Small Firm Loan  0.105*** 0.086*** 0.102*** 
[0.025] [0.026] [0.017] 
D. Medium Firm Loan 0.066*** 0.065*** 0.069*** 
[0.020] [0.021] [0.016] 
D. Micro or Small Firm Loan > EUR 1M x D. After SF 0.079 0.123* 0.186*** 
[0.057] [0.064] [0.058] 
D. Medium Firm Loan > EUR 1M x D. After SF -0.007 -0.036 -0.020 
[0.025] [0.031] [0.021] 
D. Micro or Small Firm < EUR 1M x D. After SF -0.004 0.015 -0.001 
[0.030] [0.034] [0.020] 
D. Medium Firm < EUR 1M x D. After SF -0.049* -0.060* -0.042** 
[0.027] [0.030] [0.020] 
D. After SF 0.024 0.031 0.037** 
  [0.025] [0.031] [0.018] 
Observations 6,015 3,694 8,268 
R-squared 0.139 0.150 0.145 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Firm Characteristics YES YES YES 
Country Characteristics YES YES YES 
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Table 6: Dealing with large firms affected by the Supporting Factor 
Table 6 reports the WLS estimates of equation (4) for the three periods detailed in Table 1. The 
novelty with respect to Table 3 is the introduction of a group of firms that has been excluded 
from the rest of the analyses. Those firms are large firms according to the European 
Commission definition (i.e. more than 250 employees) but with a turnover of lower than 50 
million EUR and so, affected by the SF. There are two new variables with respect to the 
specification in equation (2): D. Large Firms w/SF, which is a dummy that takes one for those 
firms and zero otherwise, and its interaction with D. After SF. The estimates for the control 
variables are not reported in the interest of brevity. Standard errors are clustered at country-
wave-SME size (i.e., micro/small, medium, large w/SF and large w/o SF firms) level and are 
reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  EU-27 EA-10 
EA-11       
(2 Waves) 
D. Micro or Small Firm 0.101*** 0.081*** 0.100*** 
[0.025] [0.025] [0.017] 
D. Medium Firm 0.066*** 0.063*** 0.068*** 
[0.020] [0.021] [0.015] 
D. Large Firms w/SF 0.055* 0.047 0.045* 
[0.030] [0.032] [0.026] 
D. Micro or Small Firm x D. After SF -0.006 0.016 0.000 
[0.031] [0.034] [0.020] 
D. Medium Firm x D. After SF -0.055** -0.068** -0.049** 
[0.027] [0.030] [0.019] 
D. Large Firms w/SF x D. After SF -0.015 0.005 -0.001 
[0.037] [0.049] [0.033] 
D. After SF 0.029 0.034 0.040** 
[0.026] [0.030] [0.018] 
Observations 6,274 3,800 8,498 
R-squared 0.144 0.155 0.140 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Firm Characteristics YES YES YES 
Country Characteristics YES YES YES 
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Table 7: Effect of the Supporting Factor on listed SMEs 
Table 7 reports the WLS estimates of equation (5) for the three periods detailed in Table 1. The 
novelty with respect to Table 3 is the introduction of a group of firms that has been excluded 
from the rest of the analyses: listed SMEs. Non-listed micro/small and medium-sized firms are 
the same used in previous analyses. There are two new variables with respect to the 
specification in equation (2): D. Listed SME, which is a dummy that takes one for those firms 
and zero otherwise, and its interaction with D. After SF. The estimates for the control variables 
are not reported in the interest of brevity. Standard errors are clustered at country-wave-SME 
(i.e., non-listed micro/small, non-listed medium, listed SME and large firms) level and are 
reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  EU-27 EA-10 
EA-11        
(2 Waves) 
D. Listed SME 0.055 0.073 0.053 
[0.038] [0.061] [0.047] 
D. Non-Listed Micro or Small Firm 0.104*** 0.086*** 0.101*** 
[0.025] [0.026] [0.017] 
D. Non-Listed Medium Firm 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.069*** 
[0.020] [0.021] [0.016] 
D. Listed SME x D. After SF -0.060 -0.054 0.003 
[0.049] [0.079] [0.079] 
D. Non-Listed Micro or Small Firm x D. After SF -0.004 0.015 -0.000 
[0.030] [0.034] [0.020] 
D. Non-Listed Medium Firm x D. After SF -0.053** -0.068** -0.050** 
[0.027] [0.030] [0.020] 
D. After SF 0.023 0.031 0.036** 
[0.025] [0.030] [0.018] 
Observations 6,190 3,742 8,360 
R-squared 0.141 0.153 0.146 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Firm Characteristics YES YES YES 
Country Characteristics YES YES YES 
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Table 8: The effect of the Supporting Factor on access to credit  
within each group of firms 
Table 8 shows an analysis based on the matching estimation technique developed in Abadie 
and Imbens (2002). This technique implements a nearest neighbor matching estimation for 
average treatment effects. The table reports the average effect of the SF on the lending 
constraints by comparing outcomes between the treated and control observations, using the 
nearest neighbor matching across the firm characteristics. We require exact matching in terms 
of the country in which the firm is located, the sector, and two dummy variables: one that 
indicates whether the firm is an individual/family firm or not and another one indicating whether 
the firm is autonomous or not. Additionally, firms are matched using the nearest neighbor in 
terms of their age. The sample used in this analysis covers the ninth and eleventh waves for 
firms located in the EU with the exception of Spain (eighth and tenth waves). Column (1) 
reports the results for the analysis in which the treatment group consists of micro/small-sized 
firms after the implementation of the SF whereas the control group consists of similar 
micro/small-sized firms, in the same sector and located in the same country, before the 
regulatory change. Columns (2), (3) and (4) report the results for the groups of medium-sized 
firms, large firms with access to the SME SF and large firms without access to the SME, 
respectively. For each analysis we report the average treatment effect together with the 
standard errors and the number of observations. A negative coefficient in Table 8 indicates that 
firms are, on average, less credit constrained after the implementation of the SF. *, **, and *** 
denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are 
reported in brackets. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Micro & Small 
Firms 
Medium Firms 
Large w/SF 
Firms 
Large Firms 
Treatment Effect 
-0.009       
[0.014] 
-0.030*       
[0.016] 
0.011         
[0.041] 
0.012       
[0.027] 
Observations 4271 2607 320 678 
 
Table 9: The effect of the Supporting Factor on access  
to credit within each group of firms (cont'd) 
Table 9 reports the linear combination of the coefficients obtained for the SF dummy variable 
and for its interaction with dummy variables referring to the different types of firms affected by 
the Supporting Factor (both SME and large firms). This analysis is implemented based on the 
sample of 27 European countries and so, the coefficients to test the magnitude of credit 
constraints for micro/small, medium-sized, and large firms are obtained from column (1) of 
Table 3 whereas the ones for large firms affected by the SF come from column (1) of Table 6. 
The linear combinations of coefficients enable us to test the effect of the Supporting Factor on 
access to credit within each group of firms. To this end, we conduct an F-test to evaluate 
whether the linear combination of the coefficients are statistically different from zero. *, ** and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Micro & 
Small Firms 
Medium 
Firms 
Large w/SF 
Firms 
Large Firms 
Linear combination of coefficients 
0.020       
[0.023] 
-0.029*       
[0.017] 
0.014       
[0.026] 
0.024       
[0.025] 
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Table 10: Effect of the Supporting Factor on the Spanish SME access to credit 
depending on the firm-bank outstanding credit balance 
Table 10 reports the OLS estimates of equation (6) in which the dependent variable in column (1) 
is the is the increase (in millions of euros) in the outstanding credit balance of bank j to firm i from 
August 2013 (the month immediately prior to the introduction of the SF in Spain) to December 
2013 (three months after the introduction date). The dependent variables in column (2) refer to a 
different time period (January to May 2013). Results are obtained for the sample of medium-sized 
firms. We restrict our sample to bank-firm total credit exposures that range between EUR 1 million 
and EUR 2 million. The dependent variable is regressed on a series of control variables and the 
variable of interest that is defined as the maximum between the difference of 1.5 minus the 
exposure of the bank i to a given firm j (in millions of euros) and zero: (max	 (1.5-Exp,0)). This 
variable is higher than zero in the case that a given firm i represents an opportunity for bank j to 
benefit from the use of the SF (i.e., the exposure of the bank to that firm is below EUR 1.5 million 
on August 2013) and zero otherwise. The control variables used in the regression analysis include 
firm, bank, and bank-firm characteristics plus fixed effects for industry and municipality. The 
estimates for the control variables are not reported in the interest of brevity. Standard errors are 
clustered at firm and bank level and are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
Max(1.5 - Exp , 0) 0.216** 0.108 
  [0.086] [0.089] 
Observations 1,961 1,815 
R-squared 0.369 0.373 
Firm Characteristics YES YES 
Bank Characteristics YES YES 
Firm-bank Characteristics YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
Municipality Code FE YES YES 
  
           BANCO DE ESPAÑA 39   DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1746 
Table 11: Effect of the Supporting Factor on the Spanish SME access to credit 
depending on the firm-bank outstanding credit balance (cont'd) 
Table 11 reports the OLS estimates of equation (6) in which the dependent variable in column (1) 
is the is the increase (in millions of euros) in the outstanding credit balance of bank j to firm i from 
August 2013 (the month immediately prior to the introduction of the SF in Spain) to December 
2013 (three months after the introduction date). The dependent variables in column (2) on the one 
hand and (3) on the other refer to different time periods (August to November 2013 and August to 
October 2013, respectively). Results are obtained for the sample of medium-sized firms. We 
restrict our sample to bank-firm total credit exposures that range between EUR 1 million and EUR 
2 million. The dependent variable is regressed on a series of control variables and the variable of 
interest that is defined as the maximum between the difference of 1.5 minus the exposure of the 
bank i to a given firm j (in millions of euros) and zero: (max	 (1.5-Exp,0)). This variable is higher 
than zero in the case that a given firm i represents an opportunity for bank j to benefit from the 
use of the SF (i.e., the exposure of the bank to that firm is below EUR 1.5 million on August 2013) 
and zero otherwise. The control variables used in the regression analysis include firm, bank, and 
bank-firm characteristics plus fixed effects for industry and municipality. The estimates for the 
control variables are not reported in the interest of brevity. Standard errors are clustered at firm 
and bank level and are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Max(1.5 - Exp , 0) 0.216** 0.133** 0.117** 
  [0.086] [0.058] [0.058] 
Observations 1,961 1,961 1,961 
R-squared 0.369 0.447 0.467 
Firm Characteristics YES YES YES 
Bank Characteristics YES YES YES 
Firm-bank Characteristics YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES 
Municipality Code FE YES YES YES 
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